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At the time of the so-called 'burst of the Japanese bubble economy
and the finishing of affairs of insolvent Jusens (Japanese housing loan
companies), the procedures for helping the Jusens were made to legis
late at the Diet. Despite the vigorous controversy among the Japanese
people as to the use of public funds to fix the problem, the loan com
panies were dealt with too easily without almost any discussion of the
legal responsibility on the lax financing by Jusen executives that
caused the very bankruptcy.
We had some doubts about why criminal responsibility was used so
infrequently in Japan, compared with the U. S. At the same time, we
had been surprised at how little the Japanese people demanded legal re
sponsibility. Their voices were usually lost by such claims as "under
the circumstances of such a crisis, and as fear of the financing system,
this is no time to question individual responsibility and the top
(i)
priority's to think about how the whole economy can do to survive."
We realize that much scholarly, long term concern in the U. S. has
been centered on crimes generated in the process of the failure of S &
Ls, with many papers being published. On the other hand, it was not
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until recently, with the finance scandals of Jusen, the Daiich Kangyo
Bank and Nomura Securities, that financial crimes have become popu
lar with Japanese academics. An article appeared on a leading law jour
nal by a lawyer who had been actually involved in Jusen clearance
and special feature articles have been put together. It is of course that
there exist some whose subject is financial crime in general, but they
do not take up Jusen problem directly as the financial crime, that is,
the organizational crime.
{Note : 'the case of criminal charge over Jusen liquidation' by Yuko
SUMITA, p. 65, Hougaku Seminar vol. 524, Aug. 1998}
(Nishida) (Jurist No. 1129)
THE BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
What makes the differences in treatment between S & Ls in the U.
S. and Jusens in Japan? Through the social analysis of the differ
ences, we could identify how to control the wrongdoings of organiza
tions. That is, what effective controls should be, or, we may be able to
recognize the difference of controls rooted in the culture of organiza-
(2)
tion. We will explore the interaction of wrongdoings of organizations,
individuals, and the integrative shaming through analyzing the net
work. We will be looking at the relevancy of the scene and situation
of the finance industry.
We must keep in mind the fundamental differences in the Savings
and Loan Association in the U. S.. A S & L is a bank which is au
thorized to accept deposits from the public and corresponds to Japa
nese credit association or union. A Jusen is not a bank and its busi
ness is limited to loaning, without the authorization to accept depos
its. This difference expresses itself in the form of the parent bank exist-
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ence in Japan and the great number of depositors in the U. S..
In both nations, it is true that we can perceive the differences of der
egulation or liberalization of S & L operation (the back spread phenom
enon caused by the reversal of long-term and short-term interest rate
(U. S)) as those differences of the circumstances around the lending insti
tutions. However, even if there can be found not so crucial differences
in the situations of the aggravation of the real estate market which
worked as a direct trigger, the incomplete supervision by the regulato
ry agency, the significant gap be still found from the standpoint of
the degree.
The laws that provide for punishment themselves do not differ that
much in either country, but it is clearly recognized that the ways of ac
tually executing the punishment differ greatly. It should be noted that
RICO-like Acts do not exist in Japan.
THE ACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES (IN U. S.
AND IN JAPAN)
INSOLVENCY OF S & LS IN THE U. S.
Around the end of 1970s, while S & Ls were providing housing mort
gage loans at a fixed interest rate, they had to expand the competition
with the newly founded Money Market Fund (a type of market inter
est rate linked for obtaining new money). So, reflecting the trend of
the Reagan administration, S & Ls were liberalized so that (1) They
were approved to deposit at the market interest rate (abolition of the re
straint on deposit interest rate, which is the fund for investments and
loans to supply), (2) The regulations on the sources for speculation
were loosen, (3) They were permitted to change their organization
from mutual-aid firms to joint stock corporations, (4 ) The FSLIC (Fed-
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eral S & Ls Insurance Corporation) was applied to them. The amount
of insured deposit per account was raised to $100,000, but this resul
ted in the inflow of deposits, since the investors need not worry about
losing their deposits however bad the financial affairs of the company
were. The above alterations of regulation led to those people willing
to commit fraud getting into the market. Offenders purchased smaller
S & L companies and, by promising higher return rates, increased depos
its rapidly. Consequently, the investments of the richer, who did not
have to be worried about the security of their deposits, were invested
into many companies in succession.
To accumulate this so-called "hot money" could make these S & Ls
into wealthy financing institutions worth billions of dollars almost over
night, but they had to search hard for speculative investors in order
to procure the depositors with extraordinarily high interest.
S & Ls invested their funds into the hands of the developers, stock
takeovers, those involved in corporate. All of these wanted to get rich
very quickly. Though they lent money to hundreds of building contrac
tors, the buildings were left unsold to be entrusted to the government.
They were the major buyers of high return junk bonds and are said to
have been the ringleaders of the Merge & Acquisition boom in 1980s
as well. Around 1982, most of the S & Ls had fallen into insolvency.
They had nothing to lose because they could pass the federally in
sured deposits on to investment : If profitable (if S & Ls gained), the
gain fell into the owner's hands, whereas if they suffered a loss, taxpay
ers shouldered it.
When the bubble economy burst and S & Ls were forced into bank
ruptcy, the RTC (Resolution Trust Corporation), which is based on
FIRREA (Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
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Act of 1989) and enacted under the Bush administration, finally car
ried out the acquisition of the insolvent S & Ls, with the disposal of
assets, the recovery of credits and so on. It disposed of 747 insolvent S
& Ls by December 1995, with $200 billion of federal funds invested.
Those S & L wrongdoings, which the offenders engaged in, can be
summed up by saying that top management siphoned money of their
firms. In spite of the aggravation of management, corporations went
on enriching themselves through rewards beyond their solvency,
credit frauds through land flips (i. e., repeatedly buying and selling
land), cash or other forms of reward received from bad loans, and
many deceptions on their books. The owner of Lincoln S & L, Charles
Keating, intended to obstruct the investigation by government and
became notorious for "the case of Keating's corruption to 5 senators".
In the U. S., Department Of Justice investigation has reported that
vast numbers of people including creditors as the managers of financ
ing firms have been placed under criminal procedure (1852 people in
dicted, 1577 found guilty, and 1072 held in custody). Of the 3669 people
found guilty in commercial banks, 2588 were held in custody. Among
those involved in credit associations, 230 guilty and 163 were sente
nced from October 1988 through June 1995. We should take into consid
eration that the above state of affairs, which shows real pursuit of crim
inal responsibility against the white-collar criminals, is the result of
the policy done as sedation for the public in introducing public funds
in the US. The total damages are estimated to be as much as $500 bil
lion (Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman, 1977 ; Sato, Weekly Toyo Keizai,
1996 ;).
216
THE DEBACLE OF JUSENS IN JAPAN
Insolvency of Jusens
In the 1970s, as part of the government's housing loan policy, Jusens
(or the housing loan exclusive corporations) were developed for joint
financing and investment by the parent banks (investors : Jusens are
constructed by the investment by the banks, and those banks created
Jusens. Here, we name 'those banks as 'the parent bank's') such as finan
cial institutions as the main banks (financing institutions which each
Jusen was financed most) and Nokyo (a credit union invested by the ag
ricultural cooperative associations). Since the conventional firms cente
red on financing corporations, they could not fully respond to housing
loan for individuals. Jusens took charge of this lending business and
were not involved with deposits.
In the 1980s, Jusens rapidly came to lose the market share in the
field of personal housing loans, with the nation's housing loan policy be
coming more and more active, and the financing limit of the National
House Loan Corporation (a governmental institution) more expanded.
This led to the direct entry into this field by major city banks that fore
saw the advantages (Saeki). The parent bank's involvement into the per
sonal loan business made Jusen especially loses their competitive abili
ty in this area. Jusens had lent money at higher interest rates by obtain
ing a loan from the parent banks. Consequently, Jusens shifted their cli
ents of lending to other borrowers in order to finance their real estate
business areas and to increase the amount of loan.
After the Japanese government decided to regulate the total sum of
financing their real estate in March 1990, Jusens grew by leaps and
bounds with their loan amount increasing, and took over the loans of
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those parent banks, but the aggravation of their management began
coming to the surface since 1991 after the burst of bubble economy.
The total sum of bad credits for the construction of office buildings,
and development of golf courses, resort lands, and Pachinko halls
during this bubble period (the total sum of 7 Jusens from 1990 to
1991) amounted to 4 trillion 647. 9 billion yen, with the ratio of bad
credit at 37.8%. Though MOF counted up this number after perform
ing an on-the-spot inspection, it did not publish this critical situation
(Nakabo).
In March 1995, the construction projects of 7 Jusens ended in fail
ure and caused the complication of the interests over the way of dispos
al by the government, parent banks of Jusens, Nokyo and others. Conse
quently, the introduction of public funds came to be focused on.
Jusens and the parent banks are private. Needless to say, therefore,
their debt repayment and credit recovery should be wholly obligated
to the private companies involved. Nevertheless, heavy burdens were
placed on the Japanese people who had nothing to do with or had no
direct obligations.
The Jusen disposal scheme for investing the public funds, which the
government decided in December 1995 with recognition of the Diet, is
unprecedented in the history of Japanese finance policy. The total of
bad debts amounted to 6410 billion yen, with parent banks renouncing
debts worth 3500 billion yen, other commercial banks, 1700 billion ;
and finance institutions invested by Nokyo shoulding 530 billion yen.
The government disbursed 685 billion for the disposal of this "primary
loss". Of the total assets except for the "primary loss", 6780 billion yen
was transferred to Housing Loan Administration Corp. (Jukan Corp.).
The government in fact let the abnormal situation run its course.
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Easy financing had been continued without holding sufficient mort
gage values throughout the bubble economy period. Banks did much
to facilitate the loans for even those clients who would never be regar
ded as the people to finance from the point of the repayment ability
or the mortgage value, etc. It might well result in failing to recover.
Nokyo was severely criticized because it had mobilized the political
power—the politicians whose party is on the basis of Nokyo and the
like—so as to reduce its loss burden as lightly as possible.
It was also made public that, behind the outflow of these financings,
there existed gangs who were involved in the scramble for recovering
credits and collateral. That is to say, the economy of the legitimate
side was eroded by that of the illegitimate side. To put it in another
way, all the contradictions finally came forward with the collapse of
bubble economy.
By means of a new legislation (special measure act related to the pro
motion of credit disposal for the specified housing loan exclusive com
panies), the Housing Loan Administration Corporation (Jukan ; hereaf
ter) was founded in July 1996 as a form of the joint-stock corporation.
Jukan is an organization that carries out recovering the credits trans
ferred from 7 Jusens, under the control of the reorganized and strengt
hened 'Deposit Insurance Organization'. Its capital (200 billion yen)
was provided by 'DIO' to Jukan as a subsidiary in accordance with na
tional policy. Thus, Jukan can be said to be a product that intensified
all the contradictions of financing administration.
The 7 Jusens are Nihon Jutaku Kin-yu Inc., Jutaku Loan Service
Inc., Juso Inc., Sogo Jukin Inc., Daiichi Jutaku Kin-yu Inc., Chigin
Seiho Jutaku Loan Inc., and Nihon Housing Loan Inc. The main duty
of the Jukan Corp. is to complete the affairs of the 7 insolvent Jusens
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(21000 cases among around 200000 of the targeted loan credit cases fall
behind in payment). In other words, the business was : (1) to execute
the work of fixing the total sum of transferred credits, ( 2 ) to work for
collecting credits, (3) to set up the investigation team (made up
mainly of lawyers), and (4) to pursue "the participants" responsibility
(to call participants to account for those who generated the causes of
the excessive financing). It took over the credits of 6112. 9 billion yen
in October 1996, got to work of the recovering since December. During
the process, it carried out petitions for bankruptcy to its big debtors,
the criminal charges against gangs that interfered with its recovering
business, and civil procedures to preserve the unlawfully occupied
real estate. In sum, it filed more than 30 criminal complaints and 28
cases had criminal arrests by the end of May 1998.
The most crucial point of the problem is to impose the responsibili
ty of the participants such as parent banks as the lenders. In this
regard, Jukan selected 287 cases which seemed to be highly involved
with misappropriations by December 1997. They stated publicly that it
would not only accuse the guilty parties of misappropriation through
Deposit Insurance Organization, but also claim civil damages and an
nounce publicly the names of respective finance firms one by one. For
the time being, Jukan, in the first court trial, claimed to Sumitomo
Bank, damages totaling 4. 8 billion yen. It has already set about to
place strict responsibility on the Bank as to the duty of its being
public, saying, "The Bank in question produced one of the biggest
causes of the generation of bad debts, making use of Jusen as if it
were a garbage box, and bringing about the circumstances of exces
sive lending in great quantity, continually, and repeatedly".
In the process of this disposal, what the people of Japan felt most dis-
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satisfied, or what brought on much criticism among the Japanese, was
that the scheme was made up not by means of the judicial procedure re
garding this trouble as mere bankrupt cases but by the conspiracy of
politicians with bureaucrats. If it ha 9 d been dealt as the former, the re
sponsibility of those who caused bankrupt would have been clear. How
ever, on the contrary, it was actually done behind closed doors, in a
sense, declaring, "to maintain the finance order". In the case of the insol
vency of 7 Jusens, to be blamed for their management is the parent
banks and a variety of financing institutions including Nokyo and the
subsidiaries that had invested to and had substantially run them, and
MOF that had ignored the lax financing circumstances as a superviso
ry office for a long time. Another source of disapproval from the
public was to invest a lot of tax to the disposal, because the public
had no responsibility for the insolvency. Moreover, the structure of
Jusen Act consists of a form which forces the people extra increased
burden in order to allot for the secondary loss (unrecoverable) out of
the National Treasury (Such a structure is more profitable for the loan
firms). This led to the outcome that the total sum the taxpayers
should pay had not been written expressly.
Mr. Kohei Nakabo who was installed as the top of Jukan (HLAC)
has suggested that the way of estimating the valuation amount of the
transferred assets by MOF involves a lot of problems, which burdens
the public with much secondary loss (Saeki ; Mainichi Shinbun Tokub-
etsu Shuzai Han ; NHK Jusen Project ; Sataka ; Nakabo ; Arimiri ;
Nakabo/Nishikiori).
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THE LEGAL PURSUIT AGAINST JUSEN
TROUBLE
No paper by scholars has yet appeared in Japan on the thesis of re
sponsibility to Jusen managers etc. Commentators and journalists are
referring to the point on TV, in magazines or in newspaper articles.
We will argue for responsibility, weaving various articles into a gener
al theory of responsibility.
There are two levels of pursuit for legal accountability on the Jusen
problem. One is the official or legal level of pursuit; (i. e., to claim dam
ages-civil control, to impose criminal punishment-criminal control,
and to impose administrative punishment-administrative control. The
other involves the extra legal level, and the critical press comments
on mass media would be a striking example of moral or ethical cen
sure of the public.
In the course of liquidating Jusen insolvency, Jukan claimed liabili
ty (responsibility for damages) to parent banks and executives of
Jusens while the prosecutors pursued the criminal responsibility of
parent banks, ex-Jusens for their lax financing, and big borrowers for
concealment of assets. MOF, from a position of administrative supervi
sion, examined the investigations and reports to MOF as to whether il
legal facts such as falsehood or obstruction etc. which are put to admin
istrative punishment exist or not, but nothing to be punished was
found. The criticism by the public concentrated on the error in adminis
trative guidance of MOF to lend institutions like Jusens, on introduc
tion of 'public funds', and on responsibility of management of finance in
stitutions.
"In spite that ex-executives added bad debts by their own business
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judgment, they retired with as much as 600 to 700 million yen. They
should take responsibility." "If a mere branch manager should loan
out, say, 10 million yen which is irrecoverable, he would be called to ac
count thoroughly and his life as a salaried worker would virtually
come to an end by being demoted to the personnel section, etc. But if
he rises as high as a director, no one in such a higher position is held re
sponsibility for anything even to the point that a manager who pro
duced bad debts worth of 100 billion yen might not be called to ac
count. Thus, former executives should take any responsibility voluntar
ily, since blamed are they who misjudged. These critical comments typ
ically appear. (Mainich Daily, 1998)
The Pursuit of Criminal Responsibility
As the leading prosecutors at the Public Prosecutor's Office called it
"the investigation as a national policy", in the pursuit of criminal respon
sibility for Jusen problem, the investigation authority disclosed big bor
rowers on such a variety of charges as the tax matter investigation,
the false entry on the original notarial document, the punishment for ob
struction to auction, etc. The government, on the one hand, burdened
the investigating authority with a role of 'ground leveling' or prepara
tion in order to make smooth investing public fund worth of 685 bil
lion yen. On the other, the people of Japan expected the entire uncover
ing of the Jusen trouble. But the investigation never revealed the respo
nsibilities of MOF and the parent banks. Above all, failure of MOF
cannot become the target unless some serious mens rea of the person
in charge might be found. It could not attain the solution of the 'black
box' of the network of Jusen—parent bank—administration, to solve
the structure of the complex of the cozy relationship of politics and bu-
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(3)
reaucracy.
Behind the results that the pursuit of criminal responsibility for
Jusen executives had ended in only one case, the following elements
could be given ; the structure of misappropriation and the difficulty of
indictment ; the 'side-by-side' or 'much alike' structure under regula
tion ; absence of competition ; the cozy relationship of the supervisory
agencies, so that the investigation does not function at all ; that every
one behaves quite similarly ; that the punishment of deviance is diffi
cult or almost impossible because of the lack of standard unlike in US,
etc. In addition, no report can be found which describes as, unlike S &
L cases, indictments by a large number of the depositors with con
crete facts rushed in.
Kitty Calavita, Henry Pontell and Robert Tillman who made re
search and investigation of the*case of Savings and Loan Associations
named the case as 'collective embezzlement' that 'the top management
of deposit institutions took advantage of organizations as a tool for emb
ezzling money'. This is a hybrid form of corporate crime (organizatio
nal crime and crime as a profession = individuals) and an offense of a cor
poration against a corporation. Furthermore, they claim that it resem
bles corporate crime in many respects, but differs in respect that the de
fendant and the offender are both an organization (Pontell, Calavita,
204 ; Coleman, Itakura, 33). The similar type can be seen in those insol
vent cases of credit associations and credit depositories in Japan, but
the actual condition of Jusen bankruptcy was rather like misappropria
tion than like embezzlement, if anything.
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The Responsibility of Jusen Executives for the
Company Pursuit of Responsibility of Jusen
Directors for Carrying Out Lax Lending
: The Case of Nihon Housing Loan (Lax Financing)
It was only one single company that was held criminally responsi
ble for lax lending as the lender. The four persons, including the presi
dent Mr. Kawahara, Nihon Housing Inc., carried out unfair finance of
6 billion yen to such groups as the real estate firm 'Okuto', a golf
course developer Takamine Resort Developing', and more than 8. 5 bil
lion yen to a real estate company 'Kolinzu', which planned urban redev
elopment by wide-scale 'ji-ague' (land corruption through forcible buy-
ing-off) in Shinjuku. The unfair finance, which was performed toward
these groups whose management turned for the worse with falling
into insolvency by the business standstill, without due mortgage, by
way of other different companies. The four in Nihon Housing Inc.
were indicted for misappropriation as a breach of Commercial Law.
The total sum of 14. 5 billion yen imposed as the special crime of mis
appropriation is never small, but the total of bad credits that the Inc.
has possessed amounts approximately to enormous 1670billion yen. In
all, the total of 7 Jusens reaches as much as 8130 billion. Compared
with the width and depth of Jusen trouble symbolized by the huge
sum of bad credits, the financing which was subject to criminal respon
sibility pursuit is just the tip of the iceberg. It is the outcome by over
coming the barrier of 5 -year prescription period and the difficulties
of the task to ascertain 'disadvantageous purpose or intention' and 'Pro
fit-making purpose' of those Jusen involved who consist the main per
sons suspected of special misappropriations. Also, as a result of the ef-
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forts made, it came to light that the person in charge of financing had
borrowed 180 million yen from the other party (a borrower) without se
curity. He had received money and goods worth of 3. 5 million yen,
and that the president had been bribed with the drawing of Bernard
Buffet and an expensive hanging scroll from the borrower (Asahi 96,
6 /17). These facts were regarded as intending to advance their own in
terests and seem to be taken into due consideration in indictment.
When the board of executives, which functions as the actual deci
sion-maker for lending, showed uneasiness to the financing in the exam
ination by the board, an executive director who came from Nihon
Kogyo Bank (hereafter, Ko-Gin) had got consensus, telling that he
would have the parent bank, Ko-Gin, support Nihon Housing Inc. In
the opening statement for the prosecution, it was indicated that Jusen
had closely connected patronage-collateral relationship with the borro
wers, and that the president had had an ambition to the parent bank
Ko-Gin in the context of its excessive financing.
(The Special Misappropriation)
When a person does office work for other people performs an
act of (1) trying to advance his or her own or a third party's inter
ests, (2) infringing on the duty so as to damage the person who
makes him or her do office work, or ( 3 ) causing damage to proper
ty (a financial loss), he or she is to be sentenced to less than 5
year's imprisonment or fined less than 500 thousand yen for crimi
nal misappropriation. When a director or auditor or anyone who
is given a particular authority by the company performs similar
acts, the person will be incurred heavier punishment, under 7
years' imprisonment or less than 3 million yen fine.
Being an intentional crime, this is not the sort that the misjudg-
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ment of the manager necessarily leads to criminal misappropria
tion and imposition of punishment. In those days of the peak of
bubble economy, the loan money with more or less insufficient col
lateral could be nearly all collectible according to the future jump
in the value of real estates. In such a context, it was no easy
matter to prove the requirement for misappropriation, that is, the
(4)
knowledge of the occurrence of damage to the company. Thus, it
is conceived to have evaded to prove based on the harmful pur
pose to damage the property of company, restricting only to the
cases aimed at advancing their own interests like accepting bribes
(Jurist, No. 1129). This might have effects on the scarce number of
criminal prosecutions along with the barrier of 5 -year prescrip
tion period of the public prosecution. It may be safely thought
that criminal responsibility was not put for the crucial misjudg-
ment of management.
Pressure to Jusens by Parent Banks
The Jusen case has quite different features from those chaotic
loan cases caused by insolvent finance institutions. For example,
the two credit association cases of Tokyo-Kyowa and Anzen were
strongly involved by embezzlement, in that the chairman of the
board of directors had 'lent to himself (self-lending), which means
actually lent to a company which is run by his relatives or family,
the fund being collected from depositors. Meanwhile, Jusen is,
unlike S & Ls in the US, a financing company without depositors,
and the executives of the firm were mostly occupied with people
from the parent bank or MOF. Thus, there were many financings
based on the direction of each parent bank. For those reasons, the
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situation surrounding the problem was rather complicated.
Seeing through a cloud hanging over its traditional business ac
quaintances, say, the solid and grand scale industrial world (the
steel, the heavy chemicals and the machine industries), Ko-gin,
one of the parent banks, needed to take the leadership in Nihon Hou
sing Loan which had been entering into the housing loan field,
with expectation of further growth of the field and with the sup
port of the government's housing policy. Ever since the installa
tion of the president of NHL succeeding to the first one who came
down from MOF, President Kawahara from Ko-gin expanded the
loan to real estate industry and boosted the business showings. Dec
laring its business policy to 'spread the financing of our company
so as to make it the most major customer for any borrower', he
pushed up NHL to No. 1 asset firm, though NHL had started
later than other Jusens. He stood high in public estimation as a
person who had rendered distinguished services to bring up NHL
as a good customer that borrowed a quantity of funds from the
parent bank, Ko-gin. In the process, he sent executives to the borro
wers, in the efforts of backing its business acquaintances financi
ally, or establishing a joint company with a borrower together. He
constructed close relationships with those 'family' companies by
lending the fund with a guarantee of their debt. Typical instances
were 'Okuto', 'Collins', and 'Takamine', all the three were disclosed
as accessory of Kawahara (Asahi, 1996).
The Responsibility for Borrowers (Pursuit of Responsibility for The
Behavior of Concealment of Assets)
Concerning 'the behavior to conceal assets' done by debtors using var-
228
ious means, every possible law available was mobilized, with tax af
fairs inquiry against tax evasion as the first step (the inquiry against
five big borrowing companies). There is no document to show the entire
ty of the disclosure, but we will describe Sueno-Kosan case as the
most symbolical example of it. It is a company financed by the total
of 236.7 billion yen from five Jusens. This is the No. 2 in respect of
the loan balance. (In connection with the concealment of assets by Sue
no-Kosan, it was indicated that its group —Sueno-Kosan and the broth
er companies— withdrew all the deposits totaled 38.6 billion yen that
they had kept in Kizu Credit Association, which triggered the insolven
cy of Kizu in the direct way, taking on the loss amount of about 1 tril
lion yen of Kizu. Knowing the business failure of Kizu, the executives
of the Credit Association concerned were blamed not only for special
misappropriation by its chaotic financing, but for fraud that it fobbed
off mortgage bonds just until seven days before the bankruptcy on 30
August, 1995.
Three persons involving President Sueno (The president of Sueno-
Kosan) were prosecuted for seven offenses involving breaches of
Income Tax Law. For example, he diverted the sum of about 310 mil
lion yen withdrawn from Sueno-Kosan under the pretext of a tempo
rary payment to his personal money to have fun. Nevertheless, he
evaded income tax of 150 million yen for that money conceived person
al income. Sueno-Kosan set up a variety of dummy firms to fictitiou
sly transfer real estates, or to purchase discount bank debentures of
about 22 billion yen with no inscription, and concealed them in a safe-
deposit boxes of finance companies and in the electric-power-controll
ing room at the basement floor of the head office, all for the purpose
of avoiding seizure. They were prosecuted for obstruction to compulso-
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(5)
ry execution.
Many of the big borrowers of Jusen are connected with organized
crime gangs (Boryoku-dan). There is no numerical data to express pre
cisely how many of the bad debts of Jusens are linked with gangs. Let
us show a fact; in buildings related to Sueno-Kosan which was borrow
ing enormous amount of fund from Jusen, a total of 8 groups of racket
eers occupied as tenants. The president of Asahi-Juken and his broth
er were recognized as ex-chief executives of a gang by Osaka Prefec
ture Police. In Togen-Sha case, gang and the concerned illegally occup
ied 45 rooms of around 1200 of a company-owned building, it is repor
ted.
The gangs are said to have had connection with local realtors
during the bubble economy when the real estate branches of big corpo
rations (big general construction companies) or banks carried out
Ji-age through local realtors as dummies for those corporations or
banks, since the local real estate companies asked the gangs to exe
cute Ji-age. Through the medium of legal business 'ji-age', a relation
ship seems to have been made up that the ordinary society share pro
fits with the dark society, a large amount of money being siphoned
off into the dark world. The process is a necessary consequence of the
act to give priority to profit making, to aim at an immense sum of
profit and to engage in excessive (unreasonable) Ji-age in disregard of
the wishes of inhabitants, making use of dummy companies which
would produce the linkage with gangs, with deregulation to land as a
background (deregulation of height and capacity limitation to skyscrap
ers, or of residential land development guideline, etc.).
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The Accountability of the Parent Banks
Finance by introduction means the acts performed by abuse or
misuse of the superior relation of the parent bank to Jusen. Under the
pretext of this "finance through introduction", Jusens were made use
of as a dumping ground for parent banks in order to push dangerous
customers (borrowers) (=dangerous elements) off onto Jusens by force
(the total sum of the introduced financing to 7 Jusens by parent
banks amounts to 1. 7286 trillion yen, and 91%of it has fallen irrecovera
ble = bad debts). However, by now, no single case for the above wrong
doings existed which was held criminally responsible. This is an organ
izational crime itself, though the responsibility for the act of introduc
ing borrowers to Jusens could not be imposed in reality under crimi
nal justice in Japan.
We will identify this act as an organizational crime. The parent
bank had sent to each Jusen such upper-level staff as the president, ex
ecutives or management, and they themselves took practical charge of
forcing the risky objects upon Jusens. Almost all the objects intro
duced by parent banks were accepted without any inspection, and the
parent banks did know minutely through the dispatched executives
that Jusens had been rapidly falling into financial difficulties.
Most of the biggest white-collar crimes are often anonymous cases
lacking the party who is responsible. In the Jusen case, the circumstan
tial evidence is indisputable. The case is fraud regarding the parent
banks as the main offender. Similarly, in considering this case cente
red on Jusen, misappropriation would be brought. This is the abuse of
the superior status of 'parent' bank to Jusen. In other words, the
parent bank imputed, pushed, and evaded dangerous (risky) elements
onto Jusen, being wide-ranged from compelling the factor of risk-he-
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dge while ranking the mortgage of parent bank at the top, to the borro
wers whose payment of interest had been already stopped.
In this context, interaction or added effects of the capital, personnel af
fairs, and loans deprived Jusens of their autonomy, weakened the base
of responsibility, diffused the corporate aims toward which the organi
zation should originally direct, and finally incurred the parent banks
making Jusens for its own use and its dumping. We can see that this cir
cumstance formed the company spirit in Jusen executives' mind to
place priority on the evaluation of the parent banks over Jusen, the com
pany for which they were working, developing the corporate culture
or the customs of the company that subordinates Jusen to parent
banks. Such a context caused the deviance of the organization.
THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF MOF
To be sure, in regard to the responsibility for administrative guid
ance of MOF, the policy to exempt Jusen from the regulation on the
total amount of loan toward real estate was intended to slowly de
crease the loan amount. So, its violation would be at the level of politi
cal responsibility unless it has some distorted character by being hand
in glove, or by being tied up to rights and interests, such as
'Amakudari' (appointment of a former official to an important post in
(6)
a finance industry through influence from above).
THE PURSUIT OF RESPONSIBILITY
BY HLAC (Jukan) :
The controversy over the ways to deal with the collapse of Jusens
was whether to employ a cooperative solution with its focus on Japa
nese style consensus, or to use legal proceedings by judiciary, proceed-
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ings which are usually characterized by law levels of and/or the con
trol of politically adjusted interests. The historical fact that consensus
had been reached through the solution under the former Japanese
way means that the truth of the finance bankruptcy had not yet been
made clear to the public. Related to this, the severe criticism against
MOF had not come forth, MOF which had put the network together
still had great authority over the financing industry (The finance indus
try had viewed the maintenance of this network as serving for profit
as well). In addition, some people think that the pressure of Liberal Dem
ocratic Party which is largely dependent on farmers' votes brought to
a political end in which the relief of financing institutions invested by
Nokyo was taken seriously.
At any rate, the scenario at the time of the founding of HLAC was
that all the pursuits of responsibility should be completed, and only
that is left should be the liquidation : Concerning the occurrence of
the secondary loss, and how to dispose of had been to be provided ex
plicitly by law so that all the problems had been to be settled. What
MOF and industry miscalculated most was that they could not make
a person on the inside of the network assume (e. g., the president of
HLAC), and that a unique figure was elected under the coalition govern
ment of LDP plus the old Socialist Party : Mr. Nakabo, a lawyer, a lead
ing figure who was once the president of Japanese Bar Association
(Nakabo, Nishikiori). His way of tackling the Jusen problem is one
based on lawsuits, and solving the problem by declaring a judicial phi
losophy of "transparency and fairness", shedding light on grounds for
pursuing the lenders' responsibility, and retaining the borrowers' re
sponsibility in open court for the purpose of the transparency. What
he has been trying to carry out is to pursue the responsibilities of len-
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ders, Jusens, and parent banks in relation to the recovery of debts. Sym
bolically, HLAC filed a suit against Sumitomo Bank, and laid responsi
bility on ex-executives of Jusens for compensatory damages. This is
based on the viewpoint that HLAC is willing to call on legal means in
the direction that would have been aimed at if Jusen problems had
been settled, not politically (Nakabo).
Filing a Suit against Sumitomo Bank as a Parent Bank
Sumitomo Bank, which takes the side of industry, would not (or
would not be able to) accept responsibility as one of the main players
which constitute the network. If Sumitomo were to accept it, it will
affect all the parent banks and they all would be considered responsi
ble.
The Case of Reconciliation by Ex-President, Niwayama
Among the ex-executives of Jusens, former president (dubbed "Mr.
Jusen") Mr. Niwayama of Nihon Jutaku Kin-yu (the biggest Jusen) ac
cepted the "responsibility" as manager of HLAC. He and HLAC ar
rived at a compromise (reconcilement) based on the terms of paying
120 million yen for compensation by selling his own house and land.
The word "responsibility" he used here is based on a series of remarks
by Mr. Niwayama which are ambiguous deal with the "responsibility
of morality" and the evasion of legal responsibility. This feeling of re
sponsibility is based on a type of apology that Japanese often use.
Some people feel that this outcome is too low, compared with the 5.
4 billion yen worth loss estimated by HLAC (Mainichi, 1998). What
HALC called into account was not the failure of his business judg
ment, but the acts related to misappropriation, (i. e., the total damages
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of 5. 4 billion yen which he caused to the company by a variety of
acts, both public and private). This involved a house in an upper-class
residential area. His company bought this and he had his daughter's
family live in and pay a surprisingly low rent of 80. OOOyen per month.
Also, there was a villa in Hawaii which also was bought by the compa
ny and which he and his friends used, etc. (Mainichi, 1998). HLAC ex
plains of the amount of 120 million yen for the agreement as follows :
Apart from whether to demand the total amount of the damages as man
agement responsibility, we required Niwayama to pay the 120 million
yen, based on his retirement allowances combined with 3 years'
salary. In this way, he must bring to a conclusion of the mixing of
public and private things related to this.
The ex-president stated, "Not that I admit HLAC's position, but I
know I am responsible for all that happened to the company. I agreed
to the terms of payment, and am not thinking of it as a legal problem,
but as a settlement based on higher moral dimension." (Asahi, 1998).
The word expressing the taking of the responsibility in Japanese is
the "Kejime", which translates as the bringing to an end or settling
based on the level of the morality. In this instance, the behavior to sell
his home (a personal asset) and not the offering of savings, deposits or
stocks, was accepted by the larger society as a concrete expression of
apology of repentance.
This is an example of restorative justice (Takahashi, ; Braithwaite,
1989 54-64). The restorative justice begins with the victim accepting
the expression of the repentance on the side of perpetrator as sincere.
Where factors lack, the agreement between the two parties comes to
no more than a bargaining.
In this instance, HLAC regarded the responsibility of a manager of
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an insolvent Jusen as bringing to an end, that is, acceptance by the
public through estimating the amount of reconciliation based on the
equivalent of the retirement allowances plus 3 years' salary, making
the acts of mixing up public and private matters which have the color
of misappropriation the grounds of legal claim.
On the other hand, while the ex-president expressed "his responsibil
ity as a captain" (Braithwaite, ; NBL), in effect, it may be assumed
that he consented to the agreement in order to evade the risks and
costs of legal proceedings (Braithwaite, ; NBL,). Again, the most impor
tant fact in bringing to an end is the fact that he actually did sell his
home and land. Because he disposed of them at the direction of HLAC,
then his behavior could be looked upon as genuine reconciliation.
HLAC, in pursuing the responsibility of managers, first classified
about 50 ex-executives of Jusens into 3 types : (1) The case of misap
propriation, where company money had been used for private use, (2)
representatives who owned the firm (similar to Mr. Niwayama in this
case), (3) Salaried managers (e. g., people transferred from the parent
bank.) And then, HLAC filed a suit for damages of the total about 3.
6 billion yen that the manager caused to the above (1) type of the ex-
-president of Nihon Housing Loan Co. etc. To the (2) type, it adopted
the policy to direct to the solution by holding consultations, reported
(Asahi, 1998).
In order to take a firm attitude without a bit of compromise to the
(1) type, that is, to pursue disciplinary compensation, while showing
a tolerant attitude to the (2), that is, restorative justice, this may be a
criterion of 'how to bring to an end as a restorative justice which Mr.
Nakabo, an experienced judicial official in Japan, presented.
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WHITE COLLAR CRIMES EXPOSED IN RELATION
TO DISPOSAL OF INSOLVENT JUSENS
The Close Relationship as a System
The next year (1997) of the inauguration of Jukan (HLAC), it was bro
ught to light the true state of affairs of the giving of profits from the
4 major securities firms to Sokai-ya by Daiich Kangyo Bank, etc.,
which had started with the exposure, by an ex-middle management
staff of Nomura Securities, of the existence of VIP accounts for giving
unfair profits to politicians, and of unfair accounts for Sokai-ya. In
the process of its criminal investigation, the close relationship of those
financial institutions with government officials in MOF and Nichi-Gin
was also made public. How the financial administration should stand
had become an issue of most important, being severely criticized by
the public as "structural corrosion" across Japan.
The major factor to support the close relation is (1) discretionary ad
ministration which has enormous authority of supervision, and ( 2 ) en
closure of information in order to keep the administration. Even if bank
ing law or other so-called finance business laws are abstractive, they
are not so difficult to apply. In respect to the interpretative applica
tion, there are cabinet orders and ministerial ordinances, enormous
volume of circulars issued by MOF and which supplement those
orders and ordinances (1200 cases in the last 5 years), and directions
by MOF under the pretext of administrative guidance lead the actual
financing administration (Economist, 1998). Still more complicated, cir
culars are not expressed clearly but have a peculiar style that can be in
terpreted so that the administrative offices do not have to take respon
sibility. It is in this equivocality that the competence of the career bu-
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reaucrats of MOF is embodied (Appropriation of power by bureaucrat
ic organization for its own use).
To cope with the situation, each bank dispatches a person in charge
of MOF' (Hereafter known as MOF charge who hunts out the inten
tions of MOF). In the case of 'excessive entertainment to bureaucrats
in MOF' (a bribery case) following 'the scandal of finance and securit
ies by Nomura Shoken and Daiichi Kan-gin, the core people in the in
dustry like Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi were disclosed one after anoth
er. Most of the people (a total of 49) are those in charge of MOF. Banks
often select the elites from the alumni of faculty of the law in Tokyo Na
tional University, since the bureaucrats are almost all the graduates.
On the other hand, persons in charge had played an important role for
MOF as well in 'teaching' MOF the true state of affairs of the finance in
dustry (Economist, 1998). Here, they were asked for advice and coopera
tion in policy making to the extent to be ridiculed that a bill is com
pleted through the way that 'firstly MOF-charge writes a draft of the
text and then bureaucrats make some revisions in it'. MOF-charge
was not approved in all the finance institutions. It was a practice permi
tted in only 19 major banks. Local banks, except for Yokohama Bank
which is the top of all the local banks, do not have MOF-charges.
Lower level local banks and credit associations were sounded out for
the intentions of MOF through Banking Association etc. (Economist,
1998). In other words, we can see that MOF and MOF-charges had a
(7)
mutual relationship of leaning on one another.
MOF encloses information and does not disclose the problem leads
to being useful in applying administrative pressure or in securing the
future posts at those finance firms, as well as to having something on
the finance institutions—the Japanese term "Amakudari (descent from
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above/ appointment of a former official to an important post in a pri
vate firm through influence from above)". At the same time, to dis
close information made a hotbed of secret maneuvers for Sokai-ya, rais
ing the value of information on injustices. The disclosure of bank scan
dals, etc. and the disclosing the informed fact and the result of investiga
tion, which should essentially be made public to the people or the
market—it is the request of the industry and at the same time it is the
source of producing Sokai-ya.
If the financing institutions become unable to get the public esti
mate that they are reliable and worthy of depositing assets, they
would not be able to maintain their business. It can be said that the
banl^s and the like are always charged with the fate, the nature of con
cealment, that they have to over-sensitively react to social evaluation.
Some wrongdoings by individuals such as embezzlement done by a
bank clerk may come to light through a tip to the police, but most of
the affairs are reported only to MOF, without informing the police. In
the unreported cases, the family or relatives are said to cover the defi
cit to settle secretly and privately. When the business content of a
bank is, if not breach of laws and regulations, problematic, Article 26
of Banking Law can be applied for the administrative measure. Only
7 cases were taken before the alarming scandal of Nomura and Dai-
ichi Kan-gin plus entertainment of MOF. All other cases like the
Daiwa Bank debacle could not be hidden secretly because they occur
red outside of Japan. The remarkable difference of the case numbers be
tween FRB or SEC in US and in Japan arises from merely the circum
stance of Japan that the trouble does not easily come to the surface,
not that cases are so few in Japan compared with the US. Those cases
called disclosure of information tend to be kept at a distance for fear
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of becoming public knowledge and to be settled secretly.
Analysis of the Structure
As mentioned above, we have examined the Jusen problem and the
surroundings in consideration of the comparison between Japan and
US. Insolvency and crime is a product that was yielded by various prob
lems involved in the system sustaining the finance order, induced by
the burst of bubble economy. It is brought about by scant resources
for supervisory agencies in deregulation or with the flow of liberaliza
tion in US. In Japan, on the contrary, finance institutions soak into
severe regulation and the advantage of the industry and administra
tion take the highest priority over true interests of the people. The situ
ations lead to the late start of liberalization as well as delay in solving
problems. This may be viewed as, in a sense, a mirror reflection of the
crimes which broke out in US. While excessive liberalization induced
wrongdoings in US, excessive regulation triggered them in Japan.
This structural problem can be divided into two parts : (1) the
system itself , and ( 2 ) the problem of the leading component constitut
ing the system (i. e., those which shoulder the system). The former is
the problem of reforming the system, while the latter involves the or
ganization (i. e., the governmental sector and the corporate sector).
The liquidation of appropriating power or system (for one's own use)
will be intensified into the dissolution of modern Leviathan, MOF radi
cally, or into how to separate the departments of finance and investiga
tion from MOF or the main body.
Let us take general view of Jusen in (1) the flow of financing funds
from parent banks through Jusens and finally to corporation (as menti
oned in the previous chapter), and ( 2 ) the flow of financial administra-
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tion from MOF toward parent banks and Jusens. In (2), it is the area
argued as corruption on the side of regulation, but contrary to the US
(8)
circumstances, the MOF administration which stands at the top
beyond political pressure has had influence on the personnel affairs of
the top of corporations on the regulated side. The revolving door' in
the US, the relation between regulatory institutions and the regulated,
corresponds to 'Amakudari (descent from heaven)' in Japan, meaning
the corrupt structure under the control of government. Not that regula
tory agency is captured by the industry, but that the industry is captu
red by regulatory agency. The structure of this close relationship
caused lenient regulation and the attitude favorable to the industry.
The finance administration in Japan was covered with a veil, was
always facing the industry, and not facing the national people. Enter
tainment of MOF bureaucrats, and an astonishing bullying by adminis
trative side to private side etc. are the examples (Economist, 1998).
In the case of bribery, through entertainment that MOF-charges
had committed with the intention to facilitate information on approv
al of a new kind of financial merchandise, the date and time of investi
gation, or public market manipulation, etc., those MOF-charges in big
10 city-banks, offering bribes, got off with only an information, that
is, a small amount of a fine (300 thousand yen to 500 thousand) or suspen
sion of indictment, but those MOF bureaucrats, on the bribees' side,
four of them were arrested and indicted, others a disciplinary dis
charge, and still worse, the two of them including a financial transac
tion administrator whose hearing of the explanation of the matter
was to be held, committed suicide. According to the inside inquiry by
MOF concerning the entertainment (self-assessed), no one suffered a dis
ciplinary discharge, three officials were subjected to resignation punish-
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ment and 112 to a reprimand. Though it was quite an absurd inquiry
that self-reports presented for the investigation were destroyed at the
moment the punishment was decided on.
As for internal punishment on the part of banks, persons in direct
charge were subjected to internal disciplinary punishments such as rep
rimand resulting in change of the workplace, which are accepted as com
parably valid by the public. Meanwhile, the punishments against
people in top post, like presidents, are taken lenient; resignation from
the post of the chair of National Bank Association, salary reductions
of 20% to 30% for three months to presidents and executives in
charge, which show little difference among banks. The post or the
task of MOF-charge can be paraphrased as a public relations section
of the planning department in an organization, which was set up by
completing the regular procedures of the organization. The duty of
which was constantly performed according to the prescribed policy of
the organization. The entertainment in question, as well as other behav
iors, were taken under the tacit consent of the super-ordinates (i. e.,
those acts are the wrongdoings done by the organization for the organ
ization). In such a case, in Japan, even if the management like the top
of an organization does not instruct to do so directly of its own
accord, to express any responsibility of supervision by means of resigna
tion or other forms is accepted as meeting the social demand. Also,
since the wrongdoings were denounced by the society to be the cor
rupt practice committed by the whole company, the resignation of the
head of corporation, who represents the whole industry, is commonly
deemed to have great significance from the view point of calming
social indignation. The exposed behaviors were not merely the acts to
entertain, but those related to infringe the official authority of govern-
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ment employees such as investigation dates, newly developed finan
cial items, or secrets. That is to say, the acts were limited to extremely il
legal to the extent that can be judged to distort the fairness of public ser
vice. Or in part, the acts are viewed as a result that the ambition of
the company-elite (MOF-charges), the success in company, surpassed
their conscience after complications.
But we must keep in mind that no single one individual in the organ
ization had ever made any profit directly out of selfish motives for his
or her own gain. That the organization did no more than end the in-
tra-punishment within the company through a reshuffling of the em
ployee in essence against the act in such a context, against the act
that the employee in charge of MOF actually got criminal punish
ment, would be worthwhile as reintegrative shaming. On the other
hand, to pay the resigned executives large sum of retirement plus
bonus money has brought severe criticism. But in practice, the money
is likely to be paid in accordance with a regular custom without any spe
cial cutting down. This fact will be a foregone conclusion from the
fact that the retired executives are the persons who have the right to
select the next term executives. As Prof. Levi has stated, "the resigna
tion of senior executives who 'accept responsibility' for acts such as un
secured 'lending' typically leads to the executives being retained
as consultants to the corporation afterwards". In the case Prof. Levi res
earches, the reason why the executives in question installed as an ad
visor or a counselor is often regarded that the person had stopped the
search to spread to executives of company and had shouldered the
guilt of the company (i. e., the employee was made the scapegoat
(Levi)).
This is viewed as the expression of an attitude to protect the compa-
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ny for which the person works, leading to preserve the bad nature
within the company forever. Unlike the situation for the lower mem
bers who constitute the organization (however, in Japan, lower mem
bers are likely to be more often pressed to retire in reality), it cannot
be so easily approved that the upper class of the organization, the corpo
rate elite, should take office as such posts after being criminally punis
hed, since it causes the unclearness as to who should be blamed.
The Social Economic Structure of the Organization and Wrongdoings
The deviance in the organization involves (1) an individual en
riches himself or herself, and (2) an individual commits a crime for
the benefit of the company he or she works for.
Even if the job of MOF-charges had been already built within the or
ganization, not all of their acts were performed with unawareness
under the pressure of organization, following blindly the policy of the
organization. As for 'leakage of the date and time of investigation', for
instance, we see in a report that "The official of MOF, having some
guilty conscience, does not tell straightforwardly but tell indirectly
with the expression that, say, "a major Japanese baseball team at
Nagoya City, Chu-Nichi Dragons, is strong, isn't it?" when Nagoya Bra
nch-bank is to be inspected, etc. Or, if you find on a desk a train
ticket which marks, say, some day in some month from Tokyo to Mis-
hima, then, the investigation would be to Mishima Branch, it means.
That, you must notice. I don't know whether the bribery ran across
the official's mind or not, but he did have some consciousness that he
was doing what he should never do (Economist, 1998 : 22)." The
individual's last selection whether he or she should embark on an ille
gal act or not causes complications and conflicts between the sense of
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public shame and that of private, under the coexistent society of a com
pany centered doctrine, or organized society and a culture of shame.
The Japanese people as working people are living daily life with occupa
tional realistic self (socialized self) and are drifting between public
shame (corporation's deviant ethics) and private shame (genuine moral
self—ideal) in diverse working situations. (Nishimura)—The sense of pri
vate shame is related to the act which the person carries, while the awa
reness of public shame is based on a sense of collaborate or public soli
darity to which the person belongs. In the framework of for the good
of a company' versus 'for one's own good', 'for the good of a company'
refers to more concrete 'fellow managers', 'fellow workers', not 'for the
sake of stockholders' nor for the good of the whole employees' (Econo
mist, 1997 : 47). The fundamental sense of value is neither nationalism
nor company consciousness but the sense of conformity with the
fellow workers.
Therefore, the self regulation/ compliance program which Fisse and
Braithwaite (1993) describes, can be replaced with a Japanese word Tat-
emae (principle ; attitude rigidly formal in public) directed at 'employ
ees as a whole'; the rule, not even looked upon as an enemy, comes to
only an empty slogan, inherently involves a momentum which de
stroys the cooperative relationship with the fellow workers, and it
loses the substantial significance domestically (in the company), and
becomes unable to retain the validity (Braithwaite).
Deviance of the Organization and Responsive Regulation
Both the enforced self regulation and National Banking Association
Ethics Charter of Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank, which Mr. W. M. Swenson, ex-
committee of Federal Sentencing Committee, appreciated, took a form
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of being ignored in the case of corrupt by entertainment (Nikkei Daily
News 1997 Oct. 10). The ethics provision on eating and drinking had
been made in MOF, too. This suggests that something must be carried
out before accepting the proposal of three "ethical climates" (Coleman,
239 ; Coleman, Itakura, 318): (1) courses in ethics should be made man
datory in business schools, ( 2) trade associations should establish uni
form ethical codes for each industry, and (3) individual corporations
should make systematic efforts to develop ethical codes and instill
them in their employees. It is the reform of relationship=network of
the theater of activity and circumstances in which MOF and the fi
nance industry of parent banks and Jusens are put. It is the shift from
an administrative system of ex-ante monitoring (pre-clearance) to ex-
-post monitoring (post-clearance) ; ex-ante monitoring may be ex
plained as, in the first place, banks ask for the instructions of MOF on
anything they do, and then, MOF leads the finance industry toward
the direction serving national interests, and finally, the whole indus
try advances to that direction (Jurist No. 1132). Under the so-called
"armed convoy system" (the former), in which major city banks and
MOF lead the whole industry through the consensus with the banking
industry, the decision and practice on the network do have an impor
tant meaning as prior to all others in the organization, and thus compli
ance program falls into only nominal as Tatemae.
This method functions as regulatory cartel, creates the side-by-side
nature, and is defected to the extent that even Deposit Insurance Organ
ization which was brought in modeled from the US, cannot demon
strate its original function. Those virtually insolvent finance institu
tions were arranged to be taken over by sounder and more prosperous
banks through asset-purchase and assumption. Following the guid-
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ance and backing of MOF, DIO could historically have only symbolic
meaning, and this fact resulted in planting the myth that the nonbank
lenders like Jusens invested by big banks cannot possibly go bank
rupt. The myth generated moral hazards for lax financing.
As Braithwaite argues, "—a punitive-adversarial regulatory style is
simply not the best strategy for maximizing compliance." (Braithw
aite, 1989 : 130). The regulatory method of this ex-post monitoring
type is not the best way. He criticizes, continuing that if regulation stig
matizes corporation, it only fosters an organized subculture of resist
ance, and that to employ informal shaming and other techniques of per
suasion flexibly and timely, which is the very responsive regulation, is
effective for regulatory agencies (Braithwaite, 1989 : 131).
The transparency of administration' as an ideology of what a true ad
ministrative proceeding should be has two aspects ; (1) the idea that
the administration should take action only through definite rules
which is made public beforehand, reducing discretion of administra
tion as much as possible, and ( 2 ) the transparency in the sense that reg
ulatory authority make clear on what grounds it depended and what
it took into consideration every time it exercises discretion, leaving dis
cretion to regulatory authority and allowing a certain latitude to the sta
ndard of behavior (Jurist No. 1139). To apply (1) to corporations, the tra
nsparency of administration is required in order not to disturb the pla
nning and carrying out the rational action in maximizing profits effec
tively within the explicit rules. But as for (2 ), Ayres and Braithwaite
suggest that what is demanded to regulatory authority is to draw
forth the aspect inside the individual or corporation of promoting the
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public interest, either of the two constituents having both aspects to
promote the public good along regulatory purpose and to look to its
own interests even against the regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite, ch.
2). They continue that the most desirable is the direction of 'respon
sive transparency' which intends to lead the object of the regulation
to cooperating together for the purpose of realizing the public inter
ests with making the discretion process transparent. They, still more,
point out that the transparency of administration without any discre
tion by thoroughly penetrating 'the rule of law' based on only clear-
-cut explicit rule may result in taking official legal measures mechani
cally. This produces harmful effects such as huge cost needed for litiga
tion afterwards, etc.
In sum, as we have stated, the regulatory agencies in Japan, as flexi
ble regulatory agencies, have dealt with the industry like family rela
tionship which Braithwaite describes as "fostering and regulating the
industry", and it has given rise to corruption in Japan. Since the admin
istration side is deep-seated and apt to avoid opening the criterion of
discretionary administration, the realization of responsive transparen
cy is difficult. Also, the discretion, which Braithwaite uses as being
played by negotiation and bargaining under the system of Common
Law, would be essentially different from the nuance of this same term
which the Japanese people use as being decided by officials and which
involves a certain vagueness under the civil law system.
SUMMARY
What prescribes the relationship that places priority on conformity
relation with fellow workers over the individual (in other words, the pri-
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vate self is oppressed on behalf of the whole) is the consciousness of
the Japanese people—ours who tend to think of, so to speak, the rela
tion between company and an individual as in contrast with public
and private. We Japanese, living in the company-centered (-oriented) so
ciety, have to obey collective behaviors or norms in order not to be
pushed aside because of being forced to submit to a group and being
controlled by competitive principle. There lies the self-deception. But
the pressure of the organization to force competition in the context of
standing side by side deprives the members of an organization of the
sense of individual responsibility in making a decision and in putting
things into practice. There can be seen undersized 'private self under
'public self.
Something private or personal is felt something uneasy for some
reason, which involves the sense of wickedness or close to evil, hard
to insist overtly. We can see this remaining in the spiritual structure
which makes it feel uneasy for an employee to stay away from the
office or to take a holiday for some reason, or which the company
makes the employee feel so.
As for the subordination of people constituting such an organiza
tion to the organization, two points at issue have been indicated : (1)
moral tone (Coleman, 1985 : 214) of the corporation (i. e., the ethical
rule and the attitude towards illegal acts, and (2) the bureaucracy.
Thus, Whyte called 'organizational man' (Coleman 1985, 214). Also,
though Reed and Yeager (1996) describe concerning the course of
socialization that a member of an organization gets incorporated into
the peculiar ethical view of the organization, as the characteristics of ra
tionalization and/or neutralization found in the cultural climate in
Japan, to apply rules exactly as they are is regarded as 'immature',
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'narrow-minded', and those who can cope flexibly with anything for in
fluential people according to and suited to circumstances, with small al
teration of rules occasion by occasion, had been lionized as 'an able
person', 'a brave (daring) man', and to possess such an ability had been
one of the requirements of promotion to upper class officials of MOF.
In fact, there was the training program of career officers (or top bureauc
rat) cultivating program to acquire the kind of sociability (on and
after entertainment scandal, the necessity to reexamine this program
has been controversial, since an official who was trained by this pro
gram assumed the office of the superintendent of a local taxation
office at the age of his late 20s, and was covered with entertainment)
(Economist 1998 : 49).
We have argued about the network composed of MOF, parent
banks, Jusens, and about the wrongdoings of the organization. The net
work is a cooperative system of 'public agencies' with 'private
corporations' (i. e., a system where public and private act in harmony).
At the same time, we have seen that the relation between public and pri
vate does lie in the relationship between an organization and an individ
ual within the organization as well. This is subconsciously held in the
mind of the individual.
The multi-layered relationship between public and private can be
found in a chain of relevancy from the living dimension continuing to
companies, administration, and to the nation itself. Whether it be char
acteristic of the Japanese society or not, that type of relationship will
be commonly seen in the existing society of Japan today. Even if the un
ified system of government combined with people which attaches
great importance to conservative consensus or that of an armed
convoy, that is, the system to protect vested rights and to allocate pro-
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fits, could suppress internal inconsistency as allocation (the way of dis
tributing the expanding share of a pie in the growing period of Japa
nese economy), it was revealed that the system produced moral
hazard to lax lending and that it could not have validity in the scram
ble for the decreasing share in the recent circumstances of the world
wide finance reform on the assumption of globalization of economic ac
tivities and the present-day finance debacles. Here we can find the inev
itability to strongly emphasize the shift to 'ex-post monitoring (post cle
arance)' type of administrative system to abolish regulations, to intro
duce the principle of competition into finance industry, and to lay
stress on the rule to control only the violators of regulations.
The above backgrounds may be said to have worked as a driving
force to accelerate the preparation of a series of laws such as banking
law or securities exchange law, to reform the system of MOF and to es
tablish an administrative agency fitted to the new way.
In Finance and Securities Scandal in 1991, though the close relation
of financing and securities industry and administration has aroused
controversy, the state of affairs has come to today's situation, not
being reformed radically. The step to the legalization from ex-ante mon
itoring style based upon administrative guidance of discretion to ex-
-post monitoring style which values rule would be made the start of shi
fting the linkage within the industry from that subordinate to the con
ventional administration to competition promotive one.
Such a stream was illustrated by Braithwaite in the argument over
the above mentioned regulatory agencies comparing Japan with US,
and Japan can be said to be undoubtedly tracing the course for the
US style. Whether the flow makes administration transparent aiming
at 'responsive Regulation' as Ayres and Braithwaite suggest, or enforc-
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ing thoroughly 'the rule of law' (Braithwaite, 1989 : adversarial proceed
ings 129) based on rules only without any discretion, which one of the
(9) (10)
two should be selected, we cannot say decisively.
NOTES
( 1 ) Our starting point of the argument for this article has begun with the fol
lowing article : Hiroshi Okumura, May 1997 : 'Musekinin no Kouzou wo Dou
Kaete-yuku ka' (How to Change the Structure of Irresponsibility): Sekai Iwa-
nami Shoten
( 2 ) Concerning wrongdoings of organization and the difference in cultures,
see co-research by Kazuhiko Tokoro, Haruo Nishimura, Naotaka Kato and
Mikio Kawai in Japan, Joseph Sanders and V. Lee Hamilton in US, and Gen-
nady Denisovsky, Paulina Kazyreva and Michael Matskovsky in Russia.
As for the Japanese version, see 'A Study on the Organizational Wrongdoing
and the Attribution of Responsibility—A Cross Cultural Survey in the Wash
ington D. C, Tokyo, and Moscow—' (Japanese Journal of Sociological Criminol
ogy, #20,1995) About a variety of the articles on corporate criminal responsibil
ity in US, see "Corporations as Criminals" by Ellen Hochstedler Steury (1984)
Sage, translated into Japanese by Hiroshi Itakura, Teruhiko Numano and Nao
taka Kato ("Kigyo : 20 Seiki no Hanzaisha", 1990 : Gakuyo-Shobo).
( 3) In arguing at the Diet over the problem solution by means of introduc
ing tax into Jusen disposal, 'Conference of Jusen trouble etc. by the three
public offices'—Supreme Public 'prosecutor's Office, Tokyo Public
Prosecutor's Office, and Tokyo District Public Prosecutor's Office—and
'Room of measures against loan and bad debts related crimes' in the Nation
al Police Agency were set up, so that such project teams were formed to
pursue criminal liability, being intimidated by the public (Asahi, 1996). Howev
er, as far as the pursuit of the responsibility for Jusen executives is con
cerned, it can be said virtually finished at the point that four persons includ
ing the president of Nihon Housing Loan, one of the 8 Jusens, were indicted
on June 16, 1996, because we cannot find any effects on the parent banks
and the like, though the investigation has been kept on thereafter.
( 4 ) Most of the bad loans from Jusens to borrowing big firms concentrated
on before 1991 when the bubble economy collapsed, when the price of land
was rising with the bubble swelling. It was a period that not only Jusens
but the financing industry itself piled up in competition with one another
the financing to real estates as if to play ducks and drakes.
( 5 ) None of the suspicions rumored about misappropriation on the Jusen
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side, called 'suspicious 5 objects', that Sueno-Kosan had three Jusen com
panies buy 5 real estates of its own possession at unprecedentedly expen
sive price, using a technical skill of 'Performance in accord and satisfaction',
the skill to clear off overdue back loan by collateral, and had the Jusens
keep the hidden loss of 8. 7 billion yen, was thrust accountability.
( 6 ) The actual responsibility of MOF, in fact, was immeasurably heavy in
the following regards : After the financing got uncollectible, the wrongdo
ings of purchasing debts at the price twice or three times as high as the cur
rent price, of buying auctioned objects by bids, or of shouldering the loans
or directing to do so, all those acts of misappropriation made assets worse.
MOF which intervened with these wrongdoings in the form of administra
tive guidance etc. should be considered immensely responsible, and yet, any
of the wrongdoings was not subject to the charge as a criminal case. Some
media reported that this was because, in the end, the prosecution had come
to end by sacrificing less important while it could not break deep into major
banks like Ko-gin in full scale under pressure of some influential politicians
(Economist, 46 : March 3, 1998).
( 7 ) Though there was a period (period of high economic growth) in which ad
ministration by a form of a unified authority of officials and the people
worked—called 'an armed convoy system', breaking off such a cozy relation
ship, that is, publicity of information and ruling of administration, would be
the most urgent task when globalization of financial transactions are gett
ing advanced at this time of the big-bang. The expulsion disposition against
Daiwa Bank by the US financial authority in 95 was the nonconfidence in
'the lack of common sense in the global society' of MOF which intended to
put off bringing the loss to light together with Daiwa Bank.
(8) Many researches have been made as to Capture Theory, but among
them, as the comprehensive one, see "Controlling Corporate Illegality—The
Regulatory Justice System" (Nancy Frank & Michael Lombness, 1988 : Ander
son Publishing)
( 9 ) We agree with Ayres and Braithwaite that they present an 'enforcement
pyramid from the perspective that 'Compliance depends more on a dynamic
enforcement game than on an economically optimal scaling of penalties',
and conceive the tripartite enforcement taking in consumers or other repre
sentative groups. Our point of view in this paper is a criticism as to pursu
ing the transparency of administration. Concerning the analysis on Tripart-
ism in Japan, see Inoue.
(10) Regarding the article in support of responsive regulation in view of con
sumer protection in Japan, see 'Kenpou-gaku kara mita Kisei to
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Shouhisha-hogo' by Yasuo Hasebe, Jurist No. 1139, 1998.
APPENDIX : THE DETAILED PROCESS OF JUSEN INSOLVENCY
The first company of housing loan specified firms was founded in :
June 1971, Nihon Jutaku Loan Inc. established
Sept. 1971, Jutaku Loan Service Inc.
Oct. 1971, Juso Inc. (former Jutaku Sogo Center)
July 1972, Sogo Jukin Inc.
May 1973, Notice by MOF that specifies Jusen firms under the direct control
of MOF to require the submission of financing limit, which enables the Su
pervisory Office (MOF) the on-the-spot investigation
Dec. 1975, Daiichi Jutaku Loan established
June 1976, Chi-Gin Life Insurance Jutaku Loan Inc.
Nihon Housing Loan
Aug. 1979, Kyodo Jutaku Loan (Nokyo and subsidiaries)
Oct. 1980, Through the official notice from MOF and No-US Ministry, Jusens
are authorized as the loan institution ruled out the application of lend
ing to non-members whose loan is restricted by Nokyo Act.
In March 1990, The chief of Banking Section in MOF issues an official notice
of 'the gross volume regulation of financing towards real estates', 'the report
(regulation) of loans to the 3 types of business—the real estate business, the con
struction industry, and the non-bank' (excluding the loan to Jusens out of this
volume limit)
Jusens were inclined towards business financing for the real estate com
panies which have nothing to do with the housing loan to an individual.
Around the same period, Nokyo-line-subsidiary loan firms, in trouble for lack
of other parties to finance (borrowers), had been expanding the new loan to
Jusens (Banks are said to have increased their own loans with bad credits push
ing to Jusens, taking advantage of this opportunity).
Housing Loan specified companies were made up for joint financing thr
ough joint investment by the parent banks—plural financing institutions,
since the conventional ones centered on financing to the corporations could
not fully respond to the housing loan directed at individuals.
The investing rates among the parent banks were largely balanced// took
on average//, that is, none of them stood out as a main bank. We can grasp
the so-called side by side financing structure (almost alike) from this point. It fol
lows that the Jusens were set up by 'cooperative joint investment of the financ
ing society'. The level-holding structure is likely to lead to 'a system of
irresponsibility', closer to an entity lacking the center which shoulders responsi-
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bility.
In the light of personnel matters of Jusens, 473 executives among a total of
532 (89%) were from MOF, and the first presidents of Jusens were all ex-
-bureaucrats of MOF without any exception. Though the parent banks had pro
duced executives and had furnished with an investment and advanced money,
the total amounts of the financing were uneven in spite of the same rate in
the sizes of an investment, so, every bank was different in the ways of participa
tion in financing to Jusens. In other words, how to take part in management
or the size of the right to speak was dependent not upon an investment but
upon the total amount of the financing.
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この論文は，カナダトロントにおいて開催された，米国犯罪学会（AmericanSoci‐
etyofCriminology）第５１回大会（1999年11月17日～20日）において報告したもの
である。本稿の主眼は，米国の貯蓄貸付組合（Ｓ＆Ｌ）の破綻処理と日本の住宅金
融専門会社の破綻処理を振り返りながら，日米の金融犯罪をめぐる諸問題を比較検
討することにある。現代の刑事司法は，この構造的問題に対処する仕方で日米では
正反対の－日米がＳ＆Ｌと住専で鏡の像のように－異なった歩みを模索し始めてい
る。それは規制＝制度の問題として行政裁量に委ねた事前調整型を求めるか，ルー
ル重視の事後監視型かに凝縮される。米国は日本が今まで歩んできた道を模索し，
日本は米国の今までの歩みを参考にして，日本の金融行政はそれを教訓として事前
から事後型へと転換を始めている。米国の方向性を示すものとしてBraithwaite教
授のいう応答的規制がある。この問題は換言すれば，犯罪の射程距離如何の問題で
もあろうか。犯罪が及ぼす影響を何処（家族，地域共同体，産業界，政官界，国家）
までのものと考えるか，という問題として，私刑から国家の刑罰権独占への歩みの
中で，捨象していったもの，抜け落ちたものを自分たちの手に取り戻す運動として，
セルフガバメント，セルフコントロール，地域社会のオートノミーの回復の問題と
ともに論じられよう。産業界と規制機関との間のパイを分け合う悪しき癒着関係の
打破を目指す企業犯罪の領域と，地域社会との協働を模索する少年非行，家庭内暴
力などの及ぼす問題性＝射程距離とは広狭があろう。異なる対応こそが現在の日本
Scandalsof`Jusens，andSocialStructureofCorporateLiability（Ｋａｔｏ・Nishimura）２５７
の状況に則していると考えている。
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